An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance by O'Connell, Jeffrey & Guinivan, James
An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of
Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance
JEFFREY O'CONNELL* AND JAMES GuINivAN**
In Automobile Accident Costs and Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury
Reparation,1 Alfred F. Conard, James Morgan, and their colleagues completed the
first comprehensive study of systems of compensation for injury and illness in the
United States. The study compiled data for the amount of benefit payments made in
the year 1960 by the major systems of compensation, including tort liability on the
one hand and loss insurance on the other,2 including workers' compensation, private
loss insurance (such as health and disability insurance), sick leave, social insurance
(such as Medicare and Medicaid), public assistance, veterans' benefits, and other
public and private health care and disability sources. The desire to bring this valuable
study up to date resulted in Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the
Conard-Morgan Tabulations,3 in which the senior author of this Article and a co-
author compiled comparable data for the year 1982, summarizing developments in
injury and illness reparation since 1960. In this current Article, we undertake the task
of updating the data concerning benefit payments by the various systems, partly just
to check the overall situation by further tracking. Our main purpose in this Article,
however, is reflected in the final footnote to the earlier article: "The senior author
expects shortly to do a further piece expanding on the significance-from a general,
as well as tort law perspective-of the relative roles of tort liability insurance and other
forms of public and private [loss] insurance," 4 such as health and disability coverages.
An important finding from the Conard-Morgan study was the dramatic rise from
1940 to 1960 in private health insurance and social insurance payouts compared to the
slower growth in liability insurance payouts. 5 Ironically, the results of the further
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1. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, A. PRATT, C. VoLZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AuToMoBIE ACCoDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
STuDIEs IN THE EcoxoMics OF IN uRy REPARATION (1964) [hereinafter CONARD & MORGAN].
2. Tort liability insurance is payable based on the defendant-insured's faulty conduct or product, with
consideration also given to the claimant's fault. Loss insurance, on the other hand, is payable without reference to fault
on anyone's part (lacking intentional-or perhaps other egregious-conduct on the claimant's part). For a description of
loss insurance systems, see O'Connell & Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan
Tabulations, 47 Oto ST. L.J. 913 (1986).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 949 n.192.
5. CONARD & MORGAN, supra note 1, at 66-74.
It should be noted that in 1960 a significantly greater share (80%) of total tort personal injury compensation was for
injury in auto accidents than was the case in 1982 (70%) or 1984 (68%). See infra Appendices A, B, C. Although tort
compensation as a whole grew by 1562% from 1960 to 1982 and by 26% from 1982 to 1984, auto liability for personal
injury only grew by 1360% and 22% over the same periods (compared with increases of 1380% and 13%, respectively,
for the universe of all compensation systems). Clearly, the explosion in the tort system has been fueled primarily by
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tracking up to 1984 show a high relative growth rate in tort liability insurance compared
to loss insurance. That contrast should make us all question our society's unconscious
decision to expand, relatively speaking, our worst compensation system. We call the
tort liability insurance system our worst compensation system because it has high
transaction costs coupled with dilatory and fortuitous payment (or lack thereof). This
makes it incongruous indeed to stint simultaneously on systems which are better from
those same points of view. It should also be noted that expanded loss insurance benefits
exacerbate liability insurance problems by subsidizing liability insurance claims (es-
pecially when coupled with the contingent fee); i.e., a party well covered by loss
insurance benefits is a much more aggressive, persistent, and ultimately successful tort
claimant. 6
In light of the findings contained herein, we offer a suggestion of how to use the
leverage of growing tort liability insurance to contract its worst aspects while
correspondingly expanding it insofar as it can be shaped to mirror and supplement
loss insurance.
Table 1 presents a summary of the amounts paid in 1960, 1982, and 1984 by the
major categories of loss-shifting systems examined by Conard and his colleagues. 7
The table also shows what percentage of the universe of all reparation systems each
category constituted in each of the three years.
Table 2 shows what proportion of the total was gained or lost by the principal
loss-shifting systems during the periods 1960 to 1982 and 1982 to 1984.
As Table 2 indicates, during the period from 1982 to 1984, private loss
insurance grew even faster (as a percentage of the total loss reparation pie) than did
tort liability. But tort liability, which took twenty-two years (from 1960 until 1982)
to grow from 7.9 percent to 8.8 percent of all reparations systems (an increase of just
under one percent), took only two more years to gain another percentage point.
Admittedly, during the same two years, private loss insurance grew more, by 1.9
percent of the whole. But it must be noted that private loss insurance in 1982
represented a much larger share (29.1 percent) of the total reparation picture than did
tort (with only 8.8 percent), so that the growth in tort was much more significant than
that in private loss insurance. In fact, although private loss insurance grew from 29.1
percent of the total to 31.0 percent, this was far from recapturing the 36.5 percent
share held by private loss insurance in 1960. Tort liability, by contrast, has been
rising steadily since 1960.8
increases in nonauto fields, which were a relatively insignificant part of the tort picture in 1960. Indeed, it may be the
case that without the enactment of no-fault auto statutes in several states, automobile liability payouts-and total tort
payouts-would have been much higher. In effect, restraints on the expansion of auto liability have helped to disguise
dramatic expansion in other areas. See TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, AN UPDATE ON THE LtABILTrY
Crsts 43-44 (1987). Two such "crisis" areas are products liability and medical malpractice, which have shown a
tremendous increase both in number of successful lawsuits and in average damage awards. Id. at 33-36; see also
O'Connell & Barker, supra note 2, at 929.
6. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
7. More detailed tabulations-and references to sources-are set forth in Appendices A (for 1984), B (for 1982),
and C (for 1960). The figures do not add up exactly due to rounding.
8. Even if the 1982-84 trends continued to the year 2004, private loss insurance would only account for 38.5%
of all reparations systems, just a little more than the 36.5% share it held in 1960, while tort would have grown from 7.9%
to 13.3% of the total. See infra Table 1 and Table 4.
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Table 1
Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems,
1960, 1982, 1984
Columns do not add perfectly due to rounding.
Amount Percentage
(dollars in billions) of Total
1960 1982 1984 1960 1982 1984
Total Tort
(including no-fault) 1.9 31 39 7.9% 8.8% 9.8%
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation 1.3 18 21 5.4% 5.0% 5.3%
Private Loss Insurance 8.7 103 125 36.5% 29.1% 31.0%
Sick Leave 1.2 11 11 5.1% 3.0% 2.8%
Social Insurance 4.3 109 117 18.1% 30.8% 28.9%
Public Assistance 1.5 39 45 6.3% 11.0% 11.1%
Veterans' Benefits 1.8 19 21 7.3% 5.4% 5.1%
Other Public Health 2.3 13 13 9.4% 3.7% 3.2%
Private Health 1.0 11 11 4.0% 3.0% 2.8%
Total 24 354 404 100% 100% 100%
Table 2
Change in Percentage of All Loss-Shifting Systems
1960-1982 1982-1984
Total Tort + .9% + 1.0%
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation - .4% + .3%
Private Loss Insurance - 7.4% + 1.9%
Sick Leave - 2.1% - .2%
Social Insurance + 12.7% - 1.9%
Public Assistance + 4.7% + .1%
Veterans' Benefits - 1.9% - .3%
Other Public Health - 5.7% - .5%
Private Health - 1.0% - .2%
Perhaps one reason why tort shows such steady and unimpeded growth in contrast
to the more restrained growth in private and social insurance, is that the latter systems
can be limited by the public's refusal to pay higher premiums or to vote for higher
taxes. 9 These systems are expanded only by affirmative decisions to pay premiums and
taxes, which are set on the basis of the total cost of the systems. The tort system, in
contrast, expands with individual decisions by judges and juries to compensate loss-
decisions made with little or no eye to the overall cost of the system.
9. Taxes are relevant to insurance systems, not only because (1) taxes fund social insurance, but also because (2)
insurance premiums paid by businesses are tax-deductible and therefore subsidized by the taxpayers, and (3) benefits are
not taxable even when they replace lost income (which would have been taxable).
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Table 3
Increase (or Decrease) in Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 1982-1984
Amount Percentage
(dollars in millions)
Total Tort
(including no-fault) +$ 8,175 +26.1%
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation + 3,602 +20.3%
Private Loss Insurance + 22,476 +21.9%
Sick Leave + 782 + 7.4%
Social Insurance + 7,870 + 7.2%
Public Assistance + 5,874 +15.0%
Veterans' Benefits + 1,614 + 8.4%
Other Public Health - 200 - 1.5%
Private Health + 300 + 2.8%
Total + $50,493 + 14.3%
Table 4
Compensation Paid by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 200410
(assuming continuation of 1982-84 trends)
Amount Percentage of
(millions of dollars) Total Benefits
Total Tort
(including no-fault) $121,219 13.3%
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation 57,391 6.3%
Private Loss Insurance 350,098 38.5%
Sick Leave 19,209 2.1%
Social Insurance 195,575 21.5%
Public Assistance 103,681 11.4%
Veterans' Benefits 36,921 4.1%
Other Public Health 11,000 1.2%
Private Health 14,200 1.6%
Total $909,294 100%
The significance of the increase in tort liability may be illustrated by a look at
Table 3, which shows how much each loss-shifting system increased in absolute
terms during the period 1982 to 1984. As can be seen, the tort system led the
increase, growing nearly twice as fast as the universe of all systems (26.1 percent as
compared to 14.3 percent). Workers' compensation, private loss insurance, and
public assistance also grew significantly.
Table 4 (which the reader should compare to Table 1) illustrates more vividly the
10. For comparable figures for 1960, 1982, and 1984, see Table 1 and Appendices.
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disproportionate recent increase in tort compensation, as contrasted with the less
dramatic increase in other loss-shifting systems, by extrapolating the trends shown
from 1982 to 1984 to a period of twenty-two years (corresponding to the period
between the original study in 1960 and the 1982 update). This extrapolation is not
offered as a prediction, but simply as an indication of the direction taken by the
1982-84 trends; indeed, it would be very surprising if the rate of increase did not level
off for some compensation systems and turn upward for others.
Figure 1 below graphically displays these trends. The chart in this figure shows
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the amounts paid by major loss-shifting systems in 1960, 1982, and 1984,11 plus
benefit amounts for selected loss-shifting systems in the years 1968 and 1969.12 The
chart then illustrates the extrapolation reported in Table 4, showing what would
happen if the trends of the two years from 1982 to 1984 were continued through 2004.
At the rate tort liability was growing between 1982 and 1984, by 2004 it would be
exceeded only by private loss insurance and social insurance-and it would be
gaining on both these systems.
We are constantly confronted in popular and technical journals with several
competing and yet complementary facts: (1) The inadequacy of insurance for health
care in the United States; 13 (2) the rising costs of even that inadequate coverage; 14 and
(3) the prodigious costs involved in meeting the shortfall between supply and demand
for such coverage.
And all this concerns only health care; it says nothing about the huge unmet
losses from lost wages following injury or illness. For a typically seriously injured
person in the United States, wage loss generally outstrips health care costs,
constituting about three-quarters of economic losses from defective products, medical
malpractice, or serious auto accidents. 15 And if health care insurance is inadequate in
11. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
12. In 1968, automobile bodily injury insurance benefits amounted to $2.7 billion, and workers' compensation
benefits to $2.4 billion. O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 749,
810-11 (1973). In 1969, private loss insurance benefits were $22 billion, social insurance benefits were S12.2 billion,
and nonautomobile bodily injury liability insurance benefits were $738 million. Id. These amounts are also reported in
J. O'CoNNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJuRY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERvIcEs 79 nn.39-41, 43, 44 (1975)
[hereinafter J. O'CoNNrEu]. (In Figure 1 above, the 1968 amounts for auto liability payouts are combined with the 1969
amounts for nonauto liability payouts.)
13. About 37.2 million persons, or 15.5% of all Americans, had no health insurance in 1985 according to the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Washington Post, Oct. 4, 1987, at HI, col. 3; BuAU OF THE CENSUs,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (Table 2). Even those with insurance may
find that it fails to cover a large part of their medical bills; elderly patients, for example, must pay out of their own pockets
the quarter of their medical expenses which is (on average) left uncovered by Medicare and by private health insurance.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, § 4 (Week in Review), at 7, col. I. It is too soon to tell exactly what total fraction of expenses
will remain uncovered after the recent passage of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360,
102 Stat. 683, which did not significantly cover long-term nursing care. The elderly are especially hard hit by costs of
nursing care, which account for 42% of their out-of-pocket medical costs. N.Y. Times, supra.
14. The cost of medical insurance is a function of medical costs generally, so that, all other things (in particular,
the costs of administering insurance) being equal, an increase in health care costs will push up the price of insurance
premiums. From 1981 to 1986, the cost of medical care rose 44%, and that of prescription drugs rose 59%, while the
Consumer Price Index for all items rose only 17.6% over the same period. N.Y. Times, supra note 13. This increase
inevitably pushes health insurance premiums up, as was illustrated dramatically in September 1987, when the Reagan
administration sought a 38.5% increase in premiums for health insurance under Medicare. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1987,
at Al, col. 6. But see Accident and Health Premiums, BEST'S RviEw, LIuE:HEALH INSURANCE EDrTON, Dec. 1987, at 92,
for the claim that premiums did not rise sufficiently in 1986 to keep pace with health costs (with insurers consequently
suffering severe underwriting losses). Either way, costs of health care are on the rise.
15. The consistency of the mix of medical versus wage loss in various types of cases has been striking: for medical
malpractice cases, 70.8% of injury losses have been wage loss, 27.1% medical loss, and 2.1% other expenses. INSURArCE
SERvICES OFFICE, REPORT OF THE ALL-INDUSTRY COMItrmEE, SPECIAL MALPRACTICE REvIEw: 1974 CLOSED CLAms SURvEY,
TICHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SuRvEY RESULTS 54 (1976). For product liability cases, 72.0% of injury losses have been wage
loss, 22.5% medical loss, and 5.5% other expenses. INSURANCE SERviCES OFFICE, PRODUCT LtABIrrTY CLOSED Ct.At
SuRvEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 45, 48 (1977). These figures closely match those for serious
automobile accidents of 74% of injury losses for wage loss, 22% for medical loss, and 4% for other losses. See U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANsPoRTATIoN, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMFENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS AND THE PREsmErr 6 (1971); the auto figures were computed using the losses listed in id., Table 2 for Medical
Expense, Wage Loss and Other Expenses (excluding property damage).
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the United States disability insurance covering wage loss is even much more ex-
iguous-and even much less likely to improve.16
Finally, it must also be pointed out how inadequate is life insurance for the
typical family in the United States. 17
Yet, despite-nay, even because of-all this inadequate first-party loss insur-
ance coverage, a much less efficient form of insurance, purporting to cover medical
and wage loss from death, illness, and injury, expands-namely, tort liability insur-
ance. 18
In a measure it is because judges and juries see the victims of illness and injury
(or their survivors) so inadequately covered by loss insurance that they invoke
liability insurance as the only alternative for covering huge, unmet losses. 19 And yet,
irony of ironies, the growth of first-party loss insurance coverage does not lessen the
growth of liability insurance but expands it! Adding to systems of social and private
loss insurance exacerbates tort liability insurance by subsidizing further and more
aggressive tort litigation by loss insurance recipients now insulated from dire need by
that very same loss insurance. This fact, when combined with hiring a lawyer at a
no-risk, contingent fee, means that loss insurance recipients are no longer induced to
settle their tort claims for comparatively low and quick payments. 20 Thus, there are
indications that no-fault auto insurance has served to subsidize and thereby inflate the
very tort liability it was designed to deflate.21 But the best evidence of this
phenomenon is provided by the huge rise of third-party liability suits by payees of
workers' compensation insurance: almost half of all product liability payments (42
percent) are made to those already covered by workers' compensation-society's
most comprehensive and generous scheme of social insurance. 22
What is to be done about the anomaly of the overly restricted growth of loss
insurance coupled with the overly expansive growth of liability insurance?
16. In 1984, 59.3 million persons had some form of short-term disability income protection (including sick leave),
and only 22.9 million had any kind of long-term disability income protection. HEATH INsuRANCE Ass'N OF AMEmCA,
1986-1987 SoURCE BoOK OF HEALTH INSuRANcE DATA 14 (Table 1.5). This was out of a total of 106.7 million employed
workers. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABTRACr OF THE UNrTE STATES 374 (Table
637).
17. Although 85% of American families (and 70% of adult Americans) were covered by life insurance in 1985,
AotERiCAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1986 LIFE INSURANCE FACr BOOK 6, the amount of protection owned by these
families equalled less than 26 months of disposable personal income per family, id. at 15, even though an industry rule
of thumb holds that the average family needs enough insurance to cover four to five years' income, S. PORTE', SYLvIA
PORTER'S NEw MONEY BOOK FOR THE 80s 930-31 (1979).
18. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
19. Inadequate coverage from loss insurance for serious injuries is indeed often the case. J. O'CoNNELL, supra note
12, at 145-47. See also O'Connell & Barker, supra note 2, at 917-18. Even so, judges and juries are usually shielded
from knowledge of what private loss insurance benefits are available to individual victims appearing as plaintiffs before
them. So even in those cases where a victim is completely (or nearly completely) compensated for economic losses by
nontort sources, see, e.g., id. at 916, 918, judges and juries are encouraged to assume that the victim is exclusively or
predominantly dependent on tort payment.
20. This is not to say that greater bargaining power for tort claimants (especially seriously injured ones) is
necessarily bad; what we do question is whether, if society is to provide greater aid to such injured parties, traditional tort
litigation is the best way to do it.
21. See O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault andNo-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. Ray. 61,
70-72 (1986).
22. INSURANCE SERVICES OmCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL NALYSIS OF SURVEY
RESULTS 63 (1977); U.S. DEP'T OF CO.ItFRCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCr LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT, atVII-85
(1977); O'Connell & Barker, supra note 2, at 933.
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At the outset, a proposal should be considered for curbing the excesses of tort
liability insurance, without shutting off a means of supplementing often inadequate
loss insurance. Under this proposal, defendants in personal injury suits will be
encouraged to offer promptly to pay injury victims' economic losses above their
collateral sources of loss insurance, periodically as such excess losses accrue, plus an
hourly fee for the claimants' lawyers. If a defendant does not make such a prompt
offer, defenses based on a claimant's fault will be forfeited; in addition, the defendant
must pay the winning plaintiff's lawyers' contingent fee in addition to the award
itself. On the other hand, a defendant making such an offer will foreclose further
pursuit of a tort claim in the normal situation; a plaintiff refusing to accept such an
early offer must then prove a case of faulty conduct or product by both a heightened
standard of (1) care (gross or wanton conduct) and (2) proof (beyond a reasonable
doubt, or at least by clear and convincing evidence). In addition, a losing plaintiff and
his counsel will be jointly and severally liable for defendant's counsel fee.23
Under this proposal, then, liability insurance is still available to pay losses not
met by loss insurance but now does so in a manner similar to such loss insurance, i.e.,
payable promptly and periodically for economic-not noneconomic-loss, with far
less spent on transaction costs in determining issues of faulty conduct or products and
the value of pain and suffering. And yet cases of egregious, quasi-criminal conduct,
where recompense limited to normal insurance reimbursement is arguably not
sufficient, are left to vindication by pursuit of tort claims under appropriate
quasi-criminal criteria of fault and proof.
Recently, there has been strong interest-both at the state and federal levels-
in mandating health insurance benefits both for the unemployed and for employees
(mostly employed by small businesses) who do not receive health insurance as a
fringe benefit. In Massachusetts, for example, Governor Michael Dukakis proposed
in September 1987 a bill that would require nearly all employers to provide health
insurance for their employees. A new state agency would cover the unemployed and
anyone else lacking health insurance coverage.2 4 A similar proposal has been
advanced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) at the federal level.25 At both
23. For further elaborations of this scheme, see O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48
OIo ST. L.J. 318 (1987); O'Connell, A Correct Diagnosis of the Ills of Liability Insurance--and a False Cure, 63
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 161 (1988). On the subject of compensation schemes' effect on deterrence, see especially these two
articles respectively at 323-24 and 174-75.
24. Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1987, at A15, col. 1. The Dukakis plan, in modified form, was recently adopted
as a part of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 23 (1988).
Such a plan-or any similar proposal at the state level-may face an obstacle in the Federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title I, § 2, 88 Stat. 832 (1974), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1462 (1982 & Supp. 1986) which preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title
I, § 514(a), 88 Stat. 897 (1974), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). Nevertheless, this preemption does not prohibit
states from taxing and regulating insurance, including health insurance, ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title I, § 514(b),
88 Stat. 832 (1974) (as ameiided by Pub. L. No. 93-473, Title ll, § 302(b), 96 Stat. 2613 (1983) and Pub. L. No. 98-397,
Title I, § 104(b), 98 Stat. 1436 (1984), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986)); it also arguably permits
states to tax employers or employees in order to set up a state-administered system of health care, allowing a credit against
this tax for privately provided health benefits. See Bovbjerg & Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent:
Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857, 906-09 (1986).
25. See S. 1265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2508, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also Hamilton,
Business in Healthy Debate Over Insurance, Washington Post, Oct. 4, 1987, at HI, col. 3. The Senate Committee on
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the federal and state levels, such proposals are being stoutly resisted as too costly to
both private employers and the government.2 6
Could a compromise be reached, reflecting the very real need for assurance of
broad scale health insurance, despite its impact on higher health insurance costs, with
a corresponding reduction in liability insurance costs? At the same time, could we
encourage liability insurance benefits to be used to promptly and efficiently supple-
ment insurance payments when health insurance and other forms of loss insurance
(including disability coverage) prove inadequate? Such a goal could be achieved by
legislating that employers (and the state), when providing health insurance that meets
the standards set by the mandatory health insurance legislation, will be allowed to deter
tort claims by any beneficiary of the mandatory health insurance by making early offers
to pay periodically such a tort claimant's net economic loss. That way, there will be
a reduction in liability insurance costs to the extent private employers and the state are
providing health insurance that meets legislative standards, with substantial, and for
some, increased, health insurance costs.
Note that a more modest experimentation with this device could call for only the
state, when a tort defendant, to be allowed to make early offers of net economic loss,
thereby deterring tort claims against the state, only to those whose health insurance
is being paid by the state (those who are unemployed or otherwise without health
insurance). This mirrors a federal no-fault health care bill introduced into recent
Congressional sessions2 7 which would allow health care providers to forestall, by
offering to pay net economic loss, the medical malpractice claims of those whose
health insurance is funded by the federal government, including those covered by
Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' and other military benefits, and CHAMPUS (Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), which provides coverage
for military dependents.
Conclusion
It is not our contention that under the proposal advanced above any reduction in
liability costs will by any means exactly correlate with increases in costs from loss
insurance mandated under proposals such as those advanced by Senator Kennedy,
Governor Dukakis, and others. Rather, our thesis is only that whereas liability
insurance dollars should be available to supplement often inadequate amounts of
private and social loss insurance, unless liability costs are thus utilized under
proposals of the type we advance, the rising availability of loss insurance will serve
to increase liability costs-a wasteful tendency too long tolerated as our society
grapples with rising insurance costs and needs.
Labor and Human Resources voted February 17, 1988, to report S. 1265 to the full Senate. Senate Labor OKs Mandated
Benefit Measure, 46 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY RaP. 363-67 (Feb. 20, 1988).
26. See, e.g., Feldstein & Feldstein, The Wrong Target for Catastrophic Insurance, column in Washington Post,
Oct. 28, 1987, at A19, col. 1 (catastrophic health insurance for Medicare recipients criticized as too costly); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1987, § 1, at 37, col. 1 (Earlier Dukakis proposal rebuffed by legislators alarmed at its cost); Hamilton, supra
note 25, at H 1, col. 3 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce claims federal bill mandating insurance through employers would lead
to reductions in pay, other benefits, and hiring levels).
27. See, e.g., H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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Appendix A
Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness
by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 1984
(dollars in millions)
Survivor Disability Medical
Tort Liability'
Auto Personal Injury
Insured Payments - -
Uninsured Payments - -
Other Insured Personal Injury Liability Payments
Medical Malpractice - -
Other - -
Railroad and Motor Carrier Personal Injury Claims
Total Tort Liability
% of All
Total Benefits
- $26,5212
-
3183
- 2,5724
-
7,8275
2,2516
39,489
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation7
Workers' Compensation
State Temp. Disab. Ins.
R.R. Temp. Disab. Ins.
Total Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation
Private Loss Insurance'
1
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Ins.
Sick Leave 15
Social Insurance 1
7
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Federal Civil Service
Other Federal
State/Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance 25
Medicaid
General Assistance
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans Benefits 30
Other Public Health
Private Health35
1,590 11,569
- 1,800
- 42
1,590 13,411
8,803 1,253
7,655 3,907
16,45812 5,16013
- 11,389
33,917
1,679
2,963
536
903
39,998
3,23031
17,779
681
4,080
1,446
1,987
25,973
7,392
7,392
10,57832
6,370
6,370
4,841
98,879
103,72014
33,050
17,854
50,904
33,891
1,658
2,000
37,549
6,97333
13,000
11,200
19,5298
1,8009
4210
21,371 5.3%
14,897
110,441
125,338 31.0%
11,38916 2.8%
51,69618
2,36019
7,04320
1,98221
2,89022
33,05023
17,85424
116,875
33,89126
1,65827
7,39228
2,00029
44,941
20,781
13 ,00034
11,20036
28.9%
11.1%
5.1%
3.2%
2.8%
$404,384 100%
9.8%
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SOURCES FOR APPENDIX A
1. See O'Connell and Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations,
47 Ono ST. L.J. 913 (1986). Because of the lump sum nature of tort awards, these benefits cannot be separated into the
components of survivor, disability, and medical benefits. Note too that the figure for tort awards reflects compensation
for noneconomic loss (such as pain and suffering), which does not fall under any of the three subcategories, and does not
include certain uninsured tort payments (such as product liability or medical malpractice damages paid by self-insuring
institutions). Even including noneconomic damages, however, tort payments comprise only about one tenth of the total
reparations systems expenditures.
2. BUREAUoFTHECENsus, U.S. DE"TOFCOMIMERCE, 1987 STATISTIcALABsTEAcr oFTie UNITED STATES 500 (Table
848).
Reported figures for auto liability insurance benefits paid include insurance payouts to compensate for bodily injury
under uninsured motorist, underinsured motorist, and no-fault auto coverage, as well as under third-party liability policies.
Letter from Pamela Loos (A.M. Best Co.) to Jeffrey O'Connell (Jan. 25, 1988) (copy on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal); letter from Mavis Walters (Insurance Services Office) to Jeffrey O'Connell (Mar. 3, 1988) (copy on file with
the Ohio State Law Journal).
Uninsured motorist coverage was developed by the insurance industry in the 1930s, at the urging of the New York
Insurance Department, to deal with the problem of injury in auto accidents caused by negligent but "judgment-proof"
drivers, who neither carried liability insurance nor owned sufficient assets to compensate their victims. A.L. WiDiss,
UNINsUtRED AND UN oERINsuRED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 1.8 (2d ed. 1987). The coverage would be provided by an
endorsement to the standard auto liability policy.
In the event of an accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured driver, this endorsement would protect the
purchaser (and other insureds as defined by the policy) by placing any insured person in the position the insured
person would have been in had the other motorist carried the minimum coverage required by the state financial
responsibility laws. Thus, recovery under the proposed endorsement was predicated on, and was within the
framework of, the existing negligence system: the right to recover for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist
or a hit-and-rn driver from an insurer issuing such an endorsement depended on showing that the claimant was
legally entitled to recover.
Id. This coverage has become widely available and is now provided for by legislation in 49 states. Id. at § 2.1.
According to figures received from A.M. Best Co., Oldwick, New Jersey, no-fault benefits represented 10.4% of
all bodily injury auto insurance payments in 1984. Letter from Pamela Loos, supra. Multiplying this ratio by total
payments for auto liability payments yields an estimate of $2.76 billion paid for no-fault auto claims in 1984.
3. This figure was computed by assuming that the personal injury payments by motorists themselves, apart from
liability coverage or from uninsured motorist coverage, amounted to a sum equal to 1.2% of the insured personal injury
payments. (This same formula was used by Conard, Morgan, and their colleagues in their 1960 study. A. CONARD, J.
MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE AccIrT CoSTs AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS
OF INJURY REPARATION 50 n.54 (1964) [hereinafter CONARD & MORGAN]. So: $26,521 million X 1.2% = $318 million.
4. 1985 BESr's AGGREGATES AND AvERAGES, PROPERTY-CAsuALTY 105. Calculated by multiplying Net Premiums
Written ($1,775 million) by a combination of Pure Loss Ratio (112.1%) and the Lass Adjustment Expense (32.8%). So:
S1,775 million X 144.9% = $2,572 million.
5. Id. at 107. Same formula used as in note 4. So: $6,479 million X 120.8% = $7,827 million.
6. We could not find a source for this information, so we have given a figure equal to 5.7% of total tort liability,
which is the percentage of 1960 tort awards paid by railroads and motor carrers. See CONARD & MORGAN, supra note 3,
at 48.
7. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 931-33.
8. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISsTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &HuMAN SERvICES, SOCIA. SEcutRrr BUtLLETIN, 1986
ANNUAL STATanCAL SuPPL.st tr 258 (Table 170).
9. Id. at 252 (Table 165). The figure given is for benefits paid under short-term disability insurance which
employers in California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island are required by state law to
provide for their employees. This insurance protects employees unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries and
illness. See C.A. VIUiAs, JR., J. TURNBULL & E. CHnrr, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SEcURTrrY, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OTHER
APPROACtiSs 255-66 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter Wtt.AMs] for a further explanation of these insurance plans.
10. SOCIAL SEcuRrrY ADMNiSTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HtAN SERvtcEs, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLEtIN, 1986
ANNUAL STATSTCAL SUPPLEMENT 252 (Table 165). The figure given is for benefits provided under insurance which
railroads are required by federal law to provide their employees to protect them in the case of short-term disability caused
by nonoccupational injury or illness. See WuI.tsats, supra note 9, at 434-35 for a further explanation of this insurance.
11. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 934-36.
12. Total death benefits from private insurance companies, veterans' life insurance, and fraternal and savings bank
life insurance were $18,700 million, of which $7,655 million came from group insurance policies and $11,045 million
came from other plans. AMEmSCpAN COUNCIL OF Lim INSURANCE, 1986 LIn INSURANCE FACT BOOK 41, 44, 104-05. Under
plans other than term insurance, death benefits include a return of savings roughly approximated by the amount of reserves
released by death in insurance company accounts. The ratio of reserves released by death to total death benefits was 20.13%
for companies reporting to the New York Insurance Department in 1984. N.Y. (STATE) INSURANCE DP'T, 1984 ANNUAL
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REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO THE LEGISLATURE, STATISTICAL TABLES FRoM ANNUAL STATEMENTS
(unpublished), Tables 4 (pt. 1), 10b (reserves released by death = $1,925 million; total death benefits = $9,467 million).
Assuming that the same ratio applies to total nongroup death benefits, loss-shifting death benefits for nongroup insurance
would be $8,803 million (= $11,045 million - (.203 x $11,045 million)), which is the figure reported in the Table.
Group policies provide almost entirely for loss shifting, CONARD & MORGAN, supra note 3, at 50 n.58, so we have
made no adjustment to the amount of group life insurance benefits paid.
13. HEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 1986 UPDATE, at 10-i1
(Tables 2.1, 2.2).
14. Id. The figure reported for group policies ($98,879 million) was reached by combining the total benefit payments
by all insurers for medical expense ($96,006 million) with those for dental expense ($7,714 million) and reducing this
figure by the amount of medical expense paid by individual and family policies ($4,841 million). The figure for group
policies excludes an estimated duplication in reported benefits, as explained in a note to Table 2.1 in the Source Book.
15. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 936-38.
16. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABsTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 355 (Table
603) (1983 figures). Of the total figure, $6,490 million was provided in sick leave for government employees, and $4,899
million was provided in sick leave for workers in private employment. Id.
17. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 938-46.
18. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUtAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BuU.ETN, 1986
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLE.MmE 252 (Table 165). (OASDI means Old Age, Survivors', and Disability Insurance.).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (1983 figures, 1984 unavailable).
23. Id. at 238 (Table 151).
24. Id. at 240-41 (Table 153) (derived by adding totals for figures labelled "persons aged 65 and older" and
"disabled persons" under heading "all services").
25. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 946-48.
26. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 359 (Table
611).
27. No updated figures are yet available, so the figure reported in the table is 3.69% of the total figure for public
assistance, the same proportion as in the 1982 update.
28. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECnRIT BUULEmT, 1986
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPpLEBdmr 269 (Table 184). (SSI means Supplemental Security Income.) Figures represented in the
table include federal and state SSI payments for general disability ($7,143 million) and for blindness ($249 million), but
do not include SSI old age payments.
29. HEALTH CARE FINANoNG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.N SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANcNG
REvmw, Fall 1985, at 20 (Table 8).
30. For an explanation of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 948-49.
31. SOCIAL SECuRITrrY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL. SECURITY BULLEIN, 1986
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SuPPi.EmENr 252 (Table 165).
32. Id.
33. ADMINISTRATOR OF VErERANs AFFAIRS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 9, 70. This figure excludes expenditures for
service-connected diseases and injuries. (The Conard-Morgan study similarly excluded service-connected expenditures.
CONARD & MORGAN, supra note 3, at 51-52 n.62.).
The figure given was computed by taking the cost of VA-provided medical care ($8,301 million, ADMINSrRATOR OF
VErERANs AFFAIRS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 9) and reducing it by the percentage of service-connected injuries and illnesses
treated (16.0%, id. at 70).
34. The figure given includes $8.4 billion reported for expenditures by "State and local hospitals" (not offset by
other revenues) and $4.6 billion reported for "Other public programs for personal health care," including "program
spending for maternal and child health; vocational rehabilitation medical payments; temporary disability insurance
medical payments; Public Health Service and other Federal hospitals; Indian health services; alcoholism, drug abuse, and
mental health; and school health." Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures 1984, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING RVEvmw, Fall 1985, 1, 20, 22 nn.4-5.
35. This category covers "Islpending by philanthropic organizations, industrial inplant health services, and privately
financed [health] construction." Id. at 10, 11 n.1 (Table 3).
36. Id.
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Appendix B
Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness
by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 1982
(dollars in millions)
Survivor Disability
Tort Liability
Auto Personal Injury
Insured Payments - -
Uninsured Payments - -
Other Insured Personal Injury Liability Payments
Medical Malpractice - -
Other - -
Railroad and Motor Carrier Personal Injury Claims
Total Tort Liability
Medical
% of All
Total Benefits
- $ 21,807
- 261
- 1,994
- 5,467
- 1,7851
31,3142 8.8%
Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation
Workers' Compensation
State Temp. Disab. Ins.
R.R. Temp. Disab. Ins.
Total Workers' and Other
Employment-Mandated
Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Ins.
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Federal Civil Service
Other Federal
State/Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Medicaid
General Assistance
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans Benefits
Other Public Health
Private Health
1,500
1,500
7,726
6,953
14,6795
9,825
1,568
56
11,449
1,385
4,144
5,529
- 10,607
33,612
1,644
2,507
424
739
38,926
3,113
17,338
668
3,664
1,428
1,035
24,133
6,126
6,126
10,203
Total All Systems
4,820
4,820
3,5724
79,082
82,654
30,875
15,071
45,946
29,399
1,442
2,100
32,941
5,851
13,200
10,900
16,145
1,568
563
17,769
12,683
90,179
102,862
10,607
50,950
2,312
6,171
1,852
1,774
30,875
15,071
109,005
29,399
1,442
6,126
2,100
39,067
19,167
13,200
10,900
$353,891
5.0%
29.1%
3.0%
30.8%
11.0%
5.4%
3.7%
3.1%
100%
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SOURCES FOR APPENDIX B
This table is taken from O'Connell & Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan
Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 924 (1986) and accompanying notes, except for corrected figures as noted in the
following footnotes for any changes made necessary by such corrected figures. Complete source information may be
consulted in the original. Percentages have been adjusted. Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding.
1. This figure is corrected from $1,783 million, as given in O'Connell & Barker, Compensatonfor njury & Illness:
An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J., 913, 924 (1986).
2. This figure is corrected from $31,312 million, as given in O'Connell & Barker, supra note I at 924.
3. This figure is corrected from $58 million, as given in O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1 at 924.
4. This figure is corrected from $3,512 million, as given in O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1 at 924.
5. Total death benefits from private insurance companies, veterans' life insurance, and fraternal and savings bank
life insurance were $16,622 million, of which $6,953 million came from group insurance policies and $9,669 million
came from other plans. AMERiCAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1984 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 37, 40, 100-01. Under
plans other than term insurance, death benefits do not simply reflect a shifting of loss but include a return on savings
roughly approximated by the amount of reserves released by death in insurance company accounts. The ratio of reserves
released by death to total death benefits was 20.1% for companies reporting to the New York Insurance Department in
1982. N.Y. (STATE) INSURANCE DEP'T, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTrENOENT oF INSURANCE TO THE LEGISLATURE,
TABLES FROM ANNUAL STATEMENTS 28, 86 (Tables 4 (pt. 1), 10b) (reserves released by death = $1,527 million; total death
benefits = $7,613 million). Assuming that the same ratio applies to total nongroup death benefits, loss-shifting death
benefits for nongroup insurance would be $7,726 million (= $9,669 million - (.201 x $9,669 million)), which is the figure
reported in the table. (This differs from the figure of $7,776 million reported in O'Connell & Barker, supra note 1, at 924,
because at the time the article was written, the authors did not have access to the figures cited for reserves released by
death and therefore made an estimate.)
Group policies are almost entirely for loss shifting, id. at 925 n.9, so no adjustment was made to the amount of group
life insurance benefits paid.
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Appendix C
Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness
by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 1960
(dollars in millions)
Survivor Disability Medical Total
Tort Liability
Auto Personal Injury
Insured Payments
Uninsured Payments
Other Insured Personal
Injury Liability Payments
Railroad and Motor Carrier
Personal Injury Claims
Total Tort Liability
Workmens' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave Payments
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans Benefits
(nonservice-connected)
Public Health Service Facilities
General Hospital and Hospital Care
Medicare
Medical Rehabilitation
Total Public Health Service
Facilities
Private Health Service Facilities
Industrial In-plant Services
Philanthropic
Total Private Health Service Facilities
* *
* *
* *
1,761 386
1,115 619
2,876 1,005
- 1,209
2,954 1,379
90 876
* $ 1,494
* 18
* 269
103
1,884
435 1,294
446
4,403
4,849 8,730
- 1,209
- 4,333
530 1,496
7.9%
5.4%
36.5%
5.1%
18.1%
6.3%
1,760 7.3%
2,174
59
18
2,251
265
700
965
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS
2,251 9.4%
965 4.0%
$23,922 100.0%
*Segregated amounts not reported
Source: A. CONARD, J.N. MORGAN, R.W. PRATT, JR., C.E. VOLTZ, AND R.L.
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
INJURY REPARATION 48-49 (1964). Conard and Morgan's voluminous source refer-
ences are not reproduced but may be consulted in the original.
% of All
Benefits

